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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL 
DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS TO THE 
USE OF ALL WATER, BOTH SURFACE 
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE 
DRAINAGE AREA OF BEAR RIVER AND 
ALL ITS TRIBUTARIES IN UTAH. 
RICHARD M. ESKELSEN, VIRGINIA E. 
ESKELSEN, and LaNEZ NORMAN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
TOWN OF PERRY, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
Supreme Court No. 900119 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
THE APPELLANTS, above-named, hereby petition for a 
rehearing of the above entitled case pursuant to Rule 35 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The appellants will be referred to as the "Eskelsens" 
and the Town of Perry will be referred to as the "Town". Refer-
ences to the two volumes of files containing pleadings, motions, 
orders, findings, and the judgment will be referred to as "R. " 
and to the transcript will be "Tr. ". 
POINTS OF LAW AND FACT 
The points of law and fact which the petitioners claim 
that the Court has overlooked or misapprehended are as follows: 
1. The 1974 application to appropriate 0.015 of a 
second foot of water, which was assigned to the Eskelsens, as 
a matter of law, established a separate and new water right 
and this issue should not be remanded to the trial court. 
2. The state engineer's memorandum decision on the 
Eskelsen 1983 application did not establish f,the Town's prior 
water right". 
3. There is no competent evidence in the record of 
any pre-1903 water right owned by Perry. 
4. The evidence admittedly shows non-use of the 
spring water by the Town from May, 1964 to 1984, and there is no 
competent evidence as to the extent and period of use of water by 
Mathews, the alleged lessee, sufficient to avoid the application 
of the forfeiture for non-use statute. 
These points will be discussed in the order stated 
under appropriate headings. 
ARGUMENT 
THE 1974 NORMAN APPLICATION ESTABLISHED 
A NEW AND SEPARATE WATER RIGHT 
Application No. 43448 (29-1064) was filed by Neil D. 
and Sylvia F. Norman on April 8, 1974, to appropriate water from 
George Davis Spring. Mr. Norman testified as follows: 
IfQ. Do you recall getting a deed from Mrs. 
Norman to you conveying a half interest in the 
George Davis Spring? 
!!A. Well, at that time it was Mrs. Davis, 
yes, she conveyed half interest to me. 
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"Q. And you got it from Mrs. Davis? 
MA. Right. 
"Q. She was your grandmother? 
ffA. Right. Then we filed on an additional 
usage of this water to take in another household. 
"Q. And that's the application you assigned 
to Mr. Eskelsen? 
"A. Right.ff (Tr. 131) 
On cross-examination, Mr. Norman testified as follows: 
ffQ. Also, Mr. Norman, when you made an appli-
cation with the state engineer, basically wasn't your 
purpose in making the application that your grand-
mother had given you a half interest in the George 
Davis Spring and you were trying to transfer that water 
right from one home to a -- to your home, too, so you'd 
have a half interest in the spring? 
ffA. Correct, yes. 
lfQ. Okay. You weren't seeking to appropriate 
another six gallons of water per minute --
"Mr. Skeen: -- I object on the grounds that it's 
entirely immaterial. The documents speak for themselves. 
"The Court: I'll allow it. I think it's relevant. 
Go ahead. 
"Q. You weren't trying to appropriate another 
six gallons of water per minute, you were just trying 
to divide the 12 gallons a minute, six gallons to you 
and six gallons to your grandmother, the Ruby Davis 
home." 
"A. That was our intent, yes." (Tr. 144-145) 
Page 4 of the Supreme Court opinion is as follows: 
"The trial court's decree does not mention the 
1974 application. On appeal, the Eskelsens allege 
that this omission is 'obviously error'. The record, 
however, indicates that the 1974 application may have 
been filed merely as a restatement of one of the half 
interests in Davis's 1957 diligent claim and not as a 
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separate or new claim at all. The testimony of the 
person who filed the application (Neil Dwayne Norman) 
indicates that his purpose was to transfer his inter-
est in the Davis diligence claim from one home to 
another. He stated that he was not seeking to approp-
riate an additional water right. In terms of quantity, 
this explanation makes sense; half of the diligence 
claim would be 6 gallons of water per minute, which is 
an amount similar to that stated in the 1974 application. 
!lAlthough it appears that the trial court's omis-
sion of the 1974 application from its decree was prob-
ably based on a finding that it was not a separate 
claim, the court never made a formal finding to that 
effect. We therefore remand this issue for the trial 
court to make a specific finding as to the status of 
the 1974 application. If the court concludes that the 
application was merely a restatement of the diligence 
claim, then pursuant to the foregoing discussion, the 
Eskelsens hold no rights under that application. If, 
on the other hand, the court concludes that the 1974 
application is in fact a separate and new claim, then 
the priority of the Eskelsen"s rights thereunder should 
be determined in the same manner as their rights under 
the 1983 application." 
The 1974 application was not protested, was assigned to 
the plaintiffs, was approved by the state engineer on July 18, 
1974, and proof of appropriation was accomplished by an election 
filed July 21, 1976. (R. 76-78) It now has the same status as a 
certificated application. A copy of the application was attached 
to Answers to Perry City's First Set of Interrogatories filed July 
23, 1987 (R. 40-84), and was received in evidence. (Def. Ex. 12) 
In petitioners1 memorandum filed March 6, 1989, pursu-
ant to the court's memorandum decision, dated February 3, 1989, 
the Eskelsens listed the 1974 water application, No. 43448, as 
one of the water rights they owned. (R. 107) A copy of the appli-
cation, marked Exhibit C, is attached,, (R. 121) The 1974 applica-
tion is also attached to the Town Trial Brief (R. 230). 
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It will be noted that paragraph 13 of the application state 
"13. Is this water to be used supplementally 
with other water rights? Yes X No . If "yes" 
identify other water rights on page 2." 
On page 2, under "Explanatory", it is stated: 
"Paragraph 13: 26 ac/ft of Pineview water per 
year. Also 1/2 interest in Dil. Claim #538 (29-934)." 
It is clear from the foregoing documents that the appli-
cants intended the water right evidenced by the 1974 application, 
discussed on pages 4 and 5 of this Court's opinion, to be supple-
mental to the water right evidenced by the Ruby Davis Diligence 
Claim No. 538 filed in 1957. 
It is apparent that this Court overlooked the language 
of the application quoted above from paragraph 13 and under the 
heading, "Explanatory". There should be no remand of the issue to 
the district court. The water right should be recognized as a 
perfected, separate and new water right by the filing of the 
"Election" in lieu of proof of appropriation as stated in line 22 
of the "State Engineer's Endorsements" on the last page of the 
application. The acceptance of an "Election" in lieu of proof is 
authorized by the last paragraph of Section 73-3-16, Utah Code. 
Although it is established by the express language of 
the application, quoted above, that the 1974 application was a new, 
separate and supplemental water right to the Ruby Davis diligence 
claim, we point out that there is no statutory provision which 
authorizes the filing of a water application as a restatement of 
a diligence claim. All perfected applications to appropriate water 
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are new and separate water rights with a priority of the date of 
filing for the quantity of water, purpose of use, and period of 
use therein specified. This is the law, 
THE STATE ENGINEER'S MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ON ESKELSENS1 1983 APPLICATION 
DID NOT ESTABLISH THE TOWN'S PRIOR RIGHT 
The Eskelsens filed their 1983 Application, No. 59399 
(29-2973), to appropriate water from the George Davis Spring. 
(Def. Ex, 12) It is stated in this Court's opinion, page 5: 
"At that time, the Town was already in the 
process of making improvements to its collection 
system- The Eskelsens had knowledge of the improve-
ments and the fact that the Town was claiming water 
rights in the spring area- The state engineer 
approved the Eskelsens1 application subject to the 
Town's prior rights. The trial court found that 
the Eskelsens1 1983 application is valid but that 
the right secured thereby is subject to the Town's 
claim and the conditions of the state engineer's 
approval. 
"The trial court's finding that the Eskelsens 
have a valid water right under their 1983 applica-
tion is correct. Moreover, the Eskelsens may have 
a water right under the 1974 application, as discussed 
earlier. The priority of any water right held by the 
Eskelsens, however, is subject to the rights of any 
senior appropriators under section 73-3-21 of the 
Utah Code...." 
The state engineer's memorandum decision is quoted in 
note 6. The decision states that: 
"The Division of Water Rights is presently 
working in the area in an effort to determine the 
extent of the Rights of Perry City which will be 
evidenced by Water User's Claim No. 29-2869 " 
The decision states further: 
"It is, therefore, ordered and Application 
No. 29-2973 (A59399) is hereby APPROVED, subject 
to prior rights and the conditions as stated above." 
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It should be noted that all approvals of applications 
by the state engineer are "subject to prior rights11. It is clear 
(1) that the state engineer did not, as stated in this court's 
opinion quoted above, approve the application subject to the 
Town's prior rights, and (2) that at most it is implied that the 
state engineer thought that there were prior rights and an effort 
was being made to determine the extent of such rights if any. 
All of the foregoing statements quoted from the opinion 
have no legal significance, because, as this Court has held and 
it is established law, the state engineer has no judicial power 
and no authority to determine water rights. 
Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P2d 748; 
United States v. District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 P2d 
1132; Rehearing denied 121 Utah 18, 242 P2d 774. 
THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
THAT PERRY OWNED ANY PRE-1903 WATER RIGHT 
This Court's opinion correctly states on page 6: 
"Because neither the Town nor its predecessors 
ever filed a statutory application to appropriate 
with the state engineer, whatever water right the 
Town has must necessarily rest upon appropriation 
by beneficial use before 1903." 
It is quoted in the opinion that the trial court stated: 
"While no one testified to all the uses made 
of the water by the original land owners, the records 
indicate that irrigation, domestic, household and 
stockwatering uses were made." (Opinion, pp 6,7) 
The opinion then states that the trial court relied on: 
(1) Records of the Box Elder County Recorder's 
Office indicating that ,fas early as 1892 the Stokes 
family entered into contracts with Stark Brothers for 
the purchase of trees for an orchard containing 50 
acres", and (2) two 1983 affidavits." (Opinion, p. 7) 
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RECORDS OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
The only record supporting the statement regarding the 
purchase of trees by James Stokes is Entry 3 in the Abstract of 
Title, No. B462 (Ex. 31) which states: 
"Instrument recites that, said party of the 
first part, in consideration of second parties 
furnishing him 740 trees as per order given by 
first party, binds himself to plant in the usual 
and customary manner, to take good care of same, 
said trees to be planted on his farm situate in 
Box Elder County, State of Utah, and more particu-
larly described as follows, to-wit: Section 36, 
T. 9N. R. 2W. containing 50 acres, for which said 
first party binds himself and his heirs to pay the 
said second party the sum of $113.75, due and pay-
able as follows: One half of the gross amount of 
the sales of the crop each year, said first party 
agrees to remit, which is to be credited hereon 
from year to year until the full amount together 
with 6% compound interest shall be paid and the 
final payment shall be made within 10 years from 
date regardless of the amount paid from year to 
year, if the amount shall not be paid prior thereto. 
And it is also understood and agreed that this shall 
be a lien upon the above described premises or real 
estate until the full amount together with interest 
shall be paid and should said first party fail to 
pay the amount together with interest, said real 
estate shall be subjected to the payment of the 
above amount.11 
Entry 3 was recorded Jan. 18, 1892. Entry 16 of the 
Abstract of Title is a State patent dated Feb. 21, 1907, recorded 
April 10, 1907, conveying to James Stokes the West half of the 
Southeast quarter of Section 36, Township 9 North, Range 2 West, 
containing 80 acres. Defendant's Exhibit 13 contains an uncerti-
fied copy of a United States patent to James Stokes, dated June 
11, 1897, conveying to him the Southwest quarter of the above-
mentioned Section 36. 
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It will be noted that there is no description of the 
land where the purchased trees were to be planted except "Section 
36, T9N, R2W, containing 50 acres...11. There is nothing in the 
record to show that the trees were actually planted in any of 
the land now owned by Perry or by the Eskelsens and were irrigated 
with water from the spring area here involved. Certainly this is 
no evidence of a water right. 
THE TWO 1983 AFFIDAVITS 
On page 7 of this Court's opinion it is stated: 
!lIn addition, the Town introduced two 1983 
affidavits. In one, Phillip Douglas Quayle, aged 
73, stated he remembered that when he was a young 
man a family by the name of Stokes owned land on 
the east bench of the Town of Perry: 'I recall 
that the Stokes Family developed certain springs, 
made catch basins, and used the water to irrigate 
crop land, stock, orchards and grapes. I was in-
formed that they began developing their springs 
prior to the 1900s.1 In a similar affidavit, Lisle 
Larsen stated, '[The Stokes family] used this water 
continuously I am told from prior to 1900 to the 
time they sold the property to the Town of Perry 
in 1917.'". (Emphasis added) 
The affidavits referred to above were included in 
Defendant's Exhibit 9 which is a statement of water users claim. 
The testimony of Robert Fotheringham, area engineer of the Logan 
office of the State Engineer, Division of Water Rights, (Tr. 153) 
is that he had in his possession lf....a copy of our working file" 
which is marked as Defendant's Exhibit 9. (Tr. 154,155) The 
water users claim was not filed in the main office of the State 
Engineer in Salt Lake City, and was not stamped and filed in the 
area office. (Tr. 188) 
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An objection was made to the water user's claim as follows: 
MMr. Skeen: Well, if the court please, I 
object to the Exhibit 9 for the reason that it 
shows on its face that it's not supported by any 
evidence. It's too vague to substantiate any 
flow of water. It shows on its face that there's 
no change application filed to change the nature 
of use from irrigation to municipal. And that 
it's an obvious effort made by -- after reviewing 
the contents of it to create some kind of a water 
right for the town of Perry. And I -- I think 
based on that, the statement of water user's claims 
should not be received." (Tr. 191,192) 
The trial court received Defendant's Exhibit 9 in 
evidence with the following comment: 
"The Court: I'll receive it based on the 
fact that it's offered to show the file, not 
necessarily for the truthfulness of any of the' 
material contained therein. So I'll accept it 
for that purpose just as an indication of the 
file. You may proceed." (Tr. 192) (Emphasis added) 
On cross-examination Mr. Fotheringham admitted that the 
claim did not show a description of any parcel of land that was 
irrigated in the early days. (Tr. 200) 
It is abundantly certain that water users claim, Exhibit 
No. 9, had no legal standing. It consisted of working papers, in-
cluding the two affidavits, and was received by the trial court 
as indicated above: "....not necessarily for the truthfulness of 
any material contained therein. So I'll accept it for that pur-
pose just as an indication of the file....". (Tr. 192) 
The affidavits, which together with the reference in 
the county records of the purchase of fruit trees, are the only 
evidence of water use prior to 1903, are obviously hearsay and 
not admissible under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 802. 
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PRE-1903 QUANTITY OF WATER USED 
The proof of a quantity of water used by the Townfs 
predecessors before 1903 is discussed on page 7 of the opinion. 
It is stated that former employees of the Town said that there 
was a flow of 1/3 of a second foot in the 1960s and that a measure-
ment was made in July 1984 after improvements were made to the 
Town's water system in 1984. The concluding sentence states: 
nThe Eskelsens correctly assert that the evidence 
as to the Stokeses1 use of a given quantity of water 
from the spring area before 1903 is vague." 
Despite the above statement that the evidence is vague, 
the Court, in the next paragraph, concluded that the "showing11 was 
sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that the Town's 
water right in 1/3 second foot was initiated prior to 1903. 
We quote: 
nIn the past, this court has held that vague 
and indefinite evidence might be insufficient to 
establish pre-1903 beneficial water use. See 
Mt. Olivet Cemetery Ass'n v. Salt Lake City, 65 
Utah 193, 235 P. 876, 878 (1925); Richfield Cotton-
wood Irr. Co. v. City of Richfield, 84 Utah 107, 
34 P.2d 945, 949 (1934) . Those cases, however, were 
decided many years ago, when it was realistic to 
expect that more direct and specific evidence about 
pre-1903 water use should be available. In 1991, 
however, it would be overly burdensome and unreal-
istic for us to require a water user to produce 
unquestionable, overwhelmingly clear evidence of 
water use. Rigid standards regarding proof of 
amounts would be virtually insurmountable barriers 
to old claims. In this case, the Town presented 
the best information available, and the Eskelsens 
did not present any evidence in rebuttal. The 
evidence does establish pre-1903 water use with a, 
reasonable certainty. Balancing the equities and 
taking into account the amount of time that has 
passed, we conclude that the showing was sufficient 
to support the trial court's conclusion that the 
Town's water right in 1/3 second foot was initiated 
prior to 1903.ff 
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In the above-quoted paragraph this Court (1) disre-
gards the basic law of water rights stated in the cases cited, 
and (2) indulges in judicial legislation by stating that "....In 
1991, however, it would be overly burdensome and unrealistic for 
us to require a water user to produce unquestionable, overwhelm-
ingly clear evidence of water use. Rigid standards regarding 
proof of amounts would be virtually insurmountable barriers to 
old claims....". 
This Court ignores the fact that although the Town 
acquired the land to which it claims water rights were appurte-
nant in 1917 (Stokes), 1921 (James S. Stokes), and 1929 (Call), 
it filed no change application pursuant to the laws requiring 
the filing of change applications. See Defendant's Exhibit 13. 
The laws requiring the filing of change applications were enacted 
in 1919, 1937, and 1939. Also, it filed no claim as required 
by Section 100-5-12, Chapter 105, Laws of Utah, 1935. It com-
pletely ignored the law. 
The change application provision in Laws of Utah, 1919, 
Ch. 67, Section 8, is "....no change of point of diversion, place 
or purpose of use shall be made except on the approval of an 
application of the owner by the State Engineer.". Laws of Utah, 
1937, Ch. 130, Section 1, 100-3-3, and Laws of Utah, 1939, Ch. 
Ill, Section 1, 100-3-3, each provide: 
"Any person who changes or who attempts to 
change a point of diversion, place or purpose of 
use, either permanently or temporarily without 
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first applying to the state engineer in the 
manner herein provided, shall obtain no right 
thereby and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, 
each day of such unlawful change constituting 
a separate offense, separately punishable." 
Section 12, Chapter 105, Laws of Utah, 1935, provides: 
"Within one year after the date of the 
approval of this act, all claimants to rights 
to the use of underground waters shall file 
notice of such claim or claims, with the state 
engineer on forms furnished by him, setting 
forth such information as the state engineer 
may require, including but not limited to the 
following: 
"The name and postoffice address of the 
person making the claim; the location of the 
well or tunnel or other means of diversion 
with reference to a United States government 
survey corner; the nature and extent of use on 
which claim of appropriation is based; the flow 
of underground water used in cubic feet per 
second or the quantity in acre feet; the time 
during which underground water has been used 
each year and the date when underground water 
was first used, 
"Failure to file notice of claim or claims, 
as provided in this section, shall be prima 
facie evidence of intent to abandon such claimed 
right or rights, and in the distribution of the 
underground waters of this state the state engi-
neer may disregard any claim not so filed." 
The Town's difficulty in obtaining evidence would not 
have arisen if it had complied with the statutes referred to and 
quoted above. The statement, "....In this case, the Town pre-
sented the best information available, and the Eskelsens did 
not present any evidence in rebuttal", is inappropriate in view 
of the fact that no competent evidence was introduced by the 
Town. 
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THERE WAS PARTIAL FORFEITURE FOR NONUSE 
The evidence adduced by the Town to show use is sum-
marized in the Reply Brief of Appellants on pages 8 to 10, with 
references to the page numbers in the transcript. Jay, a nephew 
of Elmer Mathews, testified that his uncle, starting in April 
and ending in July, watered a couple of rows of cherries and a 
row of peaches with spring water. After July he would water his 
peach row. (Tr. 241,242) Paul Barnard, Mayor of the Town from 
1978 to 1982, testified that Elmer used the water while he was 
mayor. (Tr. 254) 
Finding of Fact No. 30 is that: the Town "....has 
maintained its water rights through servicing of culinary water 
to at least 2 homes and renting of the water to an individual 
for irrigation for each year from 1964 to 1984, when Perry was 
able to place the water back into its culinary water system11. 
(R. 267) In Conclusion of Law No. 7 the trial court stated that 
a water right could not be forfeited for nonuse if, during a 
five year period, any water is beneficially used. (R. 270,270a) 
If the findings of fact and evidence are viewed most 
favorably to the Town, the maximum flow of water used by anyone 
from 1964 to 1984 would be water sufficient for two homes, 0.030 
of a second foot, and 1/3 of a second foot during the irrigation 
season from April to October. The water right to 1/3 second foot 
not used during the period from October to April (6 months) was 
forfeited for nonuse. 
In the Court's opinion, it is stated, page 10, that 
fl
....The water in this case was continuously applied to a beneficial 
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use from which the Town also benefited, even though it violates 
the Constitution in acquiring the benefit....". In holding 
that the Town continuously applied the water to beneficial use, 
the trial court and this Court overlooked the fact that during 
the 6 month non-irrigation season the water was unused. 
CONCLUSION 
The Eskelsen Petition for Rehearing should be granted 
for the reasons (1) the 1974 application, which states under 
"Explanatory" that it is supplemental to the Ruby Davis claim, 
is definitely a separate and new water right, and, as a matter of 
law, there can be no water application to restate a diligence 
claim; (2) the state engineer's decision approving the 1983 ap-
plication does not state and as a matter of law cannot state 
that it is subject to a water right of the Town; (3) there is 
no competent evidence to support a pre-1903 water right owned by 
the Town; and (4) the evidence adduced to prove beneficial use 
of water from 1964 to 1984 by the Town or its lessee does not 
cover the non-irrigation season and, as a matter of law, the 
right to 1/3 of a second foot for the 6 month irrigation season 
was forfeited for nonuse. 
Respectfully submitted, 
fxJQJfapQ<\A ^ 
E. J. SKE£N 
536 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-2329 
Attorney for Appellants 
-15-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, E. J. Skeen, certify that on October 17, 1991, 
I served four copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing 
upon counsel for the appellee in this matter by mailing them 
by first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following address 
Jeff R. Thome, Esq. 
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